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An Exploration of Market Efficiency and the Marginal Trader Hypothesis
Abstract
This research explores one possible explanation for market efficiency, the Marginal Trader Hypothesis
(MTH), which holds that a small group of active and well-informed traders are responsible for steering
market price to efficient levels. We test the appropriateness of the MTH by conducting a series of
experimental asset markets; information regarding the asset’s value was introduced to the markets so as to
evaluate the impact on market efficiency and the role of the "insider" in steering market price. The results
indicate that traders conformed to the median of three possible values, though prices failed to converge to a
Rational Expectations equilibrium.
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Introduction 
Discussion on the subject of market efficiency and the accuracy of the world’s 
financial markets, and indeed the capacities of the market mechanism as a whole, 
has grown in the past twenty years with advances in the study of experimental 
economics and finance and changes in the dynamics of the financial market 
system.  The recent global recession, stemming largely from the so-called 
“Subprime Mortgage Crisis,” led to a collapse in the global financial markets 
which has further fueled debate over the accuracy of prices in the financial 
markets relative the true intrinsic value of the stocks being traded.  The Dow 
Jones Industrial Average closed at its highest-ever price of over 14,164 on 
October 9, 2007, and lost over half that value over the following seventeen 
months, closing at a price of 6,547 on March 9, 2009.  While the bear market has 
since turned bull, the question remains as to how accurately price levels within the 
security markets reflect the true value of the stocks being traded.  An application 
of experimental economics, a discipline which studies economic theories by 
applying experimental methods, affords an opportunity to test the accuracy of a 
market for securities under parameterized conditions.  More specifically, the 
operation of experimental asset markets allows economists to explore the 
potential accuracy of the market instrument and to investigate conditions which 
foster accurate pricing within a security market; market conditions discovered to 
improve market efficiency in the laboratory can then be applied to real financial 
markets as a means of building more accurate markets which are less-susceptible 
to volatile shifts such as the recent collapse.   
Efficient prices within the financial market reflect the future earnings for a 
security, discounted for risk and the time value of money.  For example, a share of 
common stock traded on the New York Stock Exchange would be correctly priced 
if the current price in the market was equal to future dividends and capital gains 
on the security, adjusted for risk and with future cash flows discounted 
accordingly.  A single-period security, paying only one dividend at the end of the 
holding period and with no other re-sale value, would be efficiently priced in a 
market if the price at which it is trading is equal to the dividend which is later 
paid for it. 
This paper investigates the potential of the market mechanism with 
regards to efficient price formation and the underlying drivers of such a 
convergence.    Security markets have been known to operate at efficient price 
levels amidst diverse private information and despite the inclusion of poorly-
informed or “market-ignorant” traders.  Furthermore, the studies in experimental 
economics (Forsythe, Palfrey, and Plott 1982; and Plott and Sunder 1982, 1988) 
have established that markets are able to both aggregate diverse private 
information held by individual traders and disseminate this information to all 
traders through price signals and other endogenous variables. Specifically, this 
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research explores one possible explanation for market efficiency, the Marginal 
Trader Hypothesis (MTH), as well as market efficiency amidst partial 
information; the MTH suggests that a small proportion of the trader population, 
having either superior information or market intellect, are responsible for steering 
market price to efficient levels by exploiting mispricings in the market and correct 
price level as a by-product of this action.  
We test the appropriateness of the MTH by conducting three sessions of 
experimental asset markets, comprised of two stages.  The first stage was a 
prediction contest designed to teach participants about the state-selection 
mechanism and disproportionate state structure.  The second stage was comprised 
of eight consecutive rounds of computerized asset markets, in which six or twelve 
participants traded securities in a double-oral auction.  Information regarding the 
true price of the artificial securities was injected into the markets in varying 
degrees so as to evaluate the impact of insider information on market efficiency 
and the role of the "insider," defined herein as the (imposed) marginal trader, in 
steering market price.  The results of this study indicate that traders within the 
security markets studied were able to conform to prices consistent with the 
expected value of the security based on no information other than the dividend 
and state-selection structure, though the prices fail to adjust to the introduction of 
insider information to a proportion of participants.  Some shifts in price level 
reflect a lower or higher true value, though the shifts are inconsistent and 
insufficient in size so as to support the notion of a perfectly efficient market. 
This paper begins by summarizing the pertinent body of literature 
surrounding experimental asset markets and the MTH.  The second section 
describes the methodology of the study with regards to the market design and to 
the models which are tested.  The results of the study are presented in the next 
section, and thereafter discussed.  The final section is the conclusion. 
 
Literature Review 
The late economist Friedrich Hayek famously asserted what has since come to be 
called the Hayek hypothesis; it holds that holds that despite traders’ limited 
knowledge about their environment and other traders, markets can work correctly. 
(Forsythe et al. 1992) While the theory carries undeniable weight coming from a 
Nobel laureate, Hayek and those who have followed him have provided little 
explanation as to what enables markets to operate at efficient levels and continue 
to do so even with large numbers of participants of varying degrees of market 
competence.  While many explanations for this observation have been tested, the 
process of efficient price formation itself and the contributing factors remain 
largely a mystery to economists. 
 The Efficient Markets Hypothesis (EMH) broadly holds that markets are 
efficient based upon the information held by the traders within them.  The 
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supposition is divided into three forms which account for various levels of 
information disclosure: strong form, semi-strong form, and weak form.  The 
strong form of the EMH asserts that the market is efficient based upon publicly 
held information, both current and that held in the past, and also private or 
“insider” information which is held by some trader(s) but has not been publicly 
disclosed.  The semi-strong version of the EMH asserts that the market is efficient 
based solely upon the body of publicly available information, both at the current 
time and that which has been made available in the past.  Lastly, the weak form of 
the EMH asserts only that markets are efficient based upon all public information 
which has been made available in the past. 
 Within an experimental asset market in which some portion of traders are 
given insider information regarding the true value of a security, the various forms 
of the EMH explain varying levels of market efficiency with regards to that true 
value.  Under the strong form specifically, the price in the market will equal the 
true value provided the collective body of private and public information contains 
that value.  For example, if even one trader is told that the true price is not one of 
three possible values and another is told the same information about another of 
the three values, then the collective body of information “knows” that the true 
price is the remaining of the three values and a market adhering to the strong form 
of the EMH would trade the securities at that efficient price.   
This research into the Hayek hypothesis on market efficiency and potential 
explanatory models is founded on the research in two fields: the methodology and 
research design stems primarily from the field of experimental economics, while 
the marginal trader hypothesis (which comprises a central target of the study) has 
been developed in field experiment research on political stock markets.  
Therefore, each field will be separately explored through the contributions, 
methodology, and results presented by previous research selected for its 
prominence and/or relevance to the focus of this research.  In conjunction, the 
research into experimental economics and political stock markets suggests the 
following: markets can, under the proper conditions, aggregate and disseminate 
asymmetrical information to the ends of achieving rational expectations 
equilibrium; and the marginal trader hypothesis represents a plausible explanation 
of the mechanisms which steer a market to efficiency even in the presence of non-
rational trader behavior. 
 The study of experimental asset markets truly came into its own in the 
1970’s.  Researchers such as Vernon Smith began to promulgate the potential 
benefits of operating economic markets in a closed laboratory setting as a means 
of testing hypotheses on observed market behavior; Smith (1976) observed that 
all the defining characteristics which underpin market activity, such as the pursuit 
of self-interest and diverse trader information, inevitably can be simulated in an 
experimental setting.  Launching from this intrinsic link between laboratory 
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controlled markets and “real world” markets, the study of experimental 
economics has grown and developed over the past three decades.   
While much of the research in the field has been centered on testing 
economic theory in an experimental market, research into the design of 
experimental markets themselves and the effects of various parameters has been 
an underlying theme in much of the prominent research. Establishing the 
implications of various market restrictions and trader conditions in a laboratory 
setting has been particularly important to the study of market behavior, most 
notably price formation.  Various models of price formation have been studied in 
experimental markets in an attempt to explain observed market behavior and 
isolate the relevant causes of market efficiency, the most prominent of these being 
the Rational Expectations (RE) model.  The RE model holds that individual 
traders form expectations about the true state of nature based upon endogenous 
variables observed in the marketplace, and act upon both their own personal 
information and their inferences based on these observations.  In an experimental 
market with insider information, the model suggests that non-insiders will behave 
the same as insiders because the price in the market is fully revealing.  While 
research into market behavior has proven that experimental markets operating 
under certain conditions behave in accordance with the RE model, it has failed to 
yield a formal model explaining the process of price equilibration. (Forsythe and 
Lundholm 1990)   
Although the RE model and strong form of the EMH would predict the 
same market price levels under the application of insider information, that is to 
say they both explain that the market price will equal the true intrinsic price, the 
former explains this observation in a slightly different manner than does the latter.  
While the strong form of the EMH holds simply that prices will be an accurate 
reflection of all publicly and privately held information, the RE model explains 
that this will happen in equilibrium as each trader behaves as if they were aware 
of the entire body of private information; the strong form of the EMH does not 
posit this condition.  Within the context of this paper, efficient prices are defined 
as prices which reflect the body of privately held information and therefore, 
because the body of insider information as a whole contains the true value, are 
equal to the price of the security at the end of the round.  This definition is 
congruent with both the RE model and the strong form of the EMH. 
Robert Forsythe and his colleagues have developed a model for this 
process in their study of political stock markets, a unique and nonconventional 
application of experimental economic theory.  The Iowa Political Stock Market 
(IPSM), which has since come to be called the Iowa Election Market (IEM), is an 
experimental futures market which allows participants to trade securities which 
pay dividends relative the results of an upcoming election.  In their research, 
Forsythe and others have found that market efficiency is achieved through the 
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actions of marginal traders, identified broadly as well-informed and active traders 
more capable of inferring true price and willing to act on those inferences.  The 
impressive accuracy of past markets lends significant weight to their theory. 
Experimental Economics 
Through the 1960’s and early 1970’s, future Nobel Prize winning economist 
Vernon L. Smith laid the foundation for the field of experimental economics.  
Smith (1976) represents a summary of his findings and an examination of Induced 
Value Theory; many characteristics of experimental markets which now are 
intuitively familiar to economists were first published in the work.  Smith (1976) 
asserts that all the defining characteristics of market structure and individual 
behavior which underpin market activity, such as the pursuit of self-interest and 
trader information diversity, inevitably occur in an experimental setting.  
Observations of market phenomena such as price formation, Smith (1976) reports, 
can be formulated into hypotheses and tested in controlled experiments.   
Smith’s Theory of Induced Valuation holds that control, which is the 
foundation of experimentation, can be exerted by the experimenter by using a 
monetary award structure.  The theory is built upon the postulate of non-satiation, 
which states that an individual faced with a costless choice between two options, 
the first yielding more reward than the second, will always choose the first. 
(Smith 1976)  
Plott and Sunder 
Charles Plott and Shyam Sunder, through a series of studies conducted together 
and separately with other co-researchers, laid much of the foundation used to 
design this application of experimental economics.  In two studies in particular 
(1982, 1988), the pair design and operate a series of experimental asset markets 
with insider information.  The researchers explored the implications on market 
efficiency made by adjusting various parameters within their market design.  As a 
result, they have both proven various capacities of the market mechanism and also 
established conditions within the design of experimental asset markets which are, 
and are not, necessary in order to achieve efficient pricing.   
In Charles Plott and Shyam Sunder’s 1982 publication, Efficiency of 
Experimental Security Markets with Insider Information: An Application of 
Rational Expectations Models, five double-oral auction markets were run for 
several periods in which securities with one-period lives were traded.  The five 
markets were comprised of between eleven and fifteen periods, which lasted for 
seven minutes; each security paid a single dividend to the owner at the end of the 
trading period.  There were a total of eighteen certificates for securities traded in 
the first market and the supply was increased to twenty-four certificates for the 
remaining four markets.  The amounts each security paid were unique to each 
individual, an element the market designers liken to the effects of different risk 
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preferences or tax brackets among traders.  There were three groups of traders in 
each market which were given different dividend structures; each group contained 
three traders in market 1 with a total of nine participants, and each group in 
markets 1 through 4 contained four traders with a total of twelve participants. 
Payouts were also dependent on which state of nature was randomly 
selected; in four markets there were two possible states from which the true state 
was chosen at random, and in the last market there were three possible states.  In 
markets 1 and 2, the probabilities of choosing state X or state Y were 1/3 and 2/3, 
respectively.  In markets 3 and 4, the disparity was decreased and these 
probabilities were set at 2/5 for state X and 3/5 for state Y.  In market 5, there was 
a 35% chance of state X being selected, a 25% chance of state Y being selected, 
and a 40% chance of state Z being selected. 
In order to assess the efficiency of markets with insider information 
relative those without, the experimenters provided some participants with 
information on the true state of nature.  So as to not reveal “insiders” to other 
participants, the experimenters gave each participant a card which was either 
blank or contained insider information.  In control periods all cards were blank.  
In thirty-two of the fifty total periods operated in markets 2 through 5, two traders 
from each of the three groups were given perfect information as to the true state.  
In other words, one-half of the twelve traders were given a clue card providing 
them with the true state of nature.  In four periods, two each in both markets 2 and 
3, all traders were given this perfect information.  In seventeen periods, no 
information was given.  In seven of these rounds, blank cards were given to every 
trader so as to illicit uncertainty as to the presence of insiders; in the other ten of 
these periods, no cards were given out and therefore traders were aware that no 
insider information had been distributed.   
Market 1 was unique amongst the others in that the information given to 
insiders was less than certain, rather than perfect; this information was a sample 
of 10 clues which were randomly chosen for each period.  This treatment was 
used in four periods with three insiders (one from each trader group) and in three 
periods in which all traders were given information.  Of these three periods with 
all traders receiving inconclusive information, the traders in the final period were 
aware that all participants had been selected as insiders. 
The operation of the markets was broken down to three stages.  First, 
participants were trained with the mechanism which was used to draw the state of 
nature: a bingo-ball machine with 40 numbered balls which were each 
respectively linked to one of the possible states of nature.  In order to familiarize 
participants with the process, the experimenters conducted a short exercise in 
which traders were told the odds of selecting one of two states from the machine 
and asked to predict which would be drawn.  They were given $0.25 for a correct 
guess and penalized $0.10 for an incorrect guess.  In the second stage, the general 
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instructions and an explanation of the market process was read aloud to all 
participants.  The third stage was the operation of the experimental markets for 
single-term securities.   
Plott and Sunder (1982) is centered on evaluating two models which 
explain price behavior in the market: the Prior Information (PI) model and the 
Rational Expectations (RE) model.  The PI model asserts that traders are acting 
upon the information they were given going into a market round.  Within this 
study in which there were multiple trader types with heterogeneous dividend 
structures, this amounted to a trader knowing only the public information and 
their own private information.  As the model does not account for a trader 
inferring current information from price behavior in the market, the PI model is 
consistent with the weak form of the Efficient Markets Hypothesis (EMH).  The 
study observed non-insiders acting in the market based on the endogenous 
information they gathered, a finding which supports the RE model.  Furthermore, 
the performance of the RE model was found to strengthen after time and 
replication of market periods. Plott and Sunder (1982) concluded that endogenous 
variables could serve to convey the true state to the non-insiders and these non-
insiders then act on their observations.  Additionally, the study found that the 
number of possible states from which the true state of nature was drawn, be it two 
or three, did not affect the applicability of the RE model. 
Having established with Plott and Sunder (1982) that markets were able to 
disseminate information in a manner congruent with the RE model, the pair next 
addressed a market’s capacity to accomplish the inverse; Plott and Sunder (1988) 
was designed to test the ability of markets to aggregate private information from 
individual traders and then disseminate that information in a manner similar to 
that which they observed earlier.   
Eleven double-oral markets were run in the study, the first two of which 
were run using state-contingent claims followed by periods allowing only a single 
compound security to be traded.  The remaining nine were single-asset markets, 
with six of the markets offering traders diverse dividends and the others structured 
with uniform dividends among all traders.   
Subjects in every market, who were undergraduate and graduate students, 
received two or more single-period assets which paid dividends depending on the 
realized state of nature.  While the true state of nature was only publicly revealed 
at the end of the period, every trader was given diverse, imperfect information 
regarding the state (which was randomly selected before the experiments began).  
No participant was aware of the dividend structure of any other trader.  After one 
of the three possible states of nature (X, Y, or Z) was drawn, each trader was 
given information that it was not one of the two remaining states.  For example if 
state X was drawn, one-half of traders were told that the state was “not Y” and the 
other half was told that the state was “not Z.”  
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The operation of markets was again divided into stages, though the 
experimenters added a fourth stage in which traders were familiarized with the 
mechanism used to distribute information.  This additional process was done after 
traders were taught the state selection process. 
Both the RE model and the PI model were tested, along with the Maximin 
model, in which traders are assumed to act only on prior information which they 
know to be certain.  In other words, they will only purchase a security if they are 
certain the true value is higher than the asking price and likewise sell only when 
they are sure the price offered is greater than the true value.  Markets described by 
this model thus settle at the greatest price perceived amongst all traders to be the 
minimum possible true value of the asset.   
Based on the performance in their contingent claims markets and uniform 
dividends markets, Plott and Sunder (1988) conclude that markets do have the 
capacity to aggregate diverse information as the RE model holds.  The research 
did conversely find that not all markets behave in a manner congruent with the RE 
model; they observed markets with a diverse dividend structure could not 
aggregate information successfully.  The study represents an extension of Plott 
and Sunder (1982), researching more into the capacity of the market mechanism 
as an aggregator of information. 
Further Experimental Work 
The findings of Plott and Sunder (1988), specifically the contrasting results they 
observed in markets yielding uniform dividends and those paying diverse 
dividends, were further explored by Forsythe and Lundholm (1990).  Their study 
represents an examination of this disparity and an attempt to discover what 
specific market parameters would enable a market to aggregate information 
despite differences in trader preferences.  Forsythe and Lundholm (1990) likewise 
explore the validity of the Maximin, PI and RE models.  They argue that the RE 
model arguably demands too much from traders’ ability to forecast, especially the 
need to predict the equilibrium price of a security in multiple possible future 
states; while the RE model seemingly expects too much from traders, the Prior 
Information (PI) model appears to do the opposite.  
Forsythe and Lundholm (1990) ran nineteen markets, each of which was 
conducted over two nights.  The first eight, labeled BC (better chance) markets, 
were structured so as to give the markets the best chance of reaching an efficient 
equilibrium under the RE model.  Twelve traders were evenly divided into two 
groups and asked to trade a fixed supply of a single-period asset which paid 
diverse dividends depending on which of three possible states of nature were 
drawn.  Each group of six traders was given their own unique dividend payoff 
structure, though both structures were publicly disclosed.  Traders switched 
groups for the second night, so that Type I traders on the first night became Type 
II on the second and vice versa.  One half of each trader type was told one payoff 
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state that would not occur, so that the market as a whole “knew” the true state 
which would occur but no single trader was explicitly informed.  If information 
aggregation did occur, the researchers assert, traders could determine the true 
market state with absolute certainty.  The remaining markets were designed to 
include a partial set of the BC market parameters, allowing the experimenters to 
isolate the relevant components to achieving RE equilibrium given the condition 
of diverse trader preferences. 
After establishing that the BC markets would achieve RE equilibrium, 
Forsythe and Lundholm (1990) altered the parameters for the subsequent markets.  
They manipulated several components of the BC markets, specifically isolating 
the effects of removing several components they identified as potential impacts on 
a market’s ability to aggregate information.  In four CT (constant type) markets, 
the experimenters held a trader’s dividend payout schedule constant over both 
nights.  The following four markets, labeled NCK (no common knowledge), 
retained most of the conditions of the CT markets with the exception that 
dividend payout structures were not publicly disclosed.  The final three markets, 
coded ERT (experience and random type) were unique in that they were 
conducted on a single night by agents who had already participated in the BC 
markets; also, each trader was randomly assigned to a group and the results of 
these assignments was kept undisclosed. 
Among their conclusions, Forsythe and Lundholm found that rotating 
trader types for the second night was unnecessary to achieve RE equilibrium, 
indeed operating markets over two nights was found to be unnecessary altogether 
as proven by the success of the ERT models in achieving REE.  Observing the 
experimental markets heavy dependency on replication and experience as 
foundations for achieving REE, the authors note that traders with previous 
experience in double oral auctions (such as the subjects in the ERT models who 
had already participated in an earlier BC market) were able to infer endogenous 
information and act on these observations.  The rapidity with which the ERT 
models achieved REE stands in contrast to the BC markets, which required a large 
number of replicate periods.   
The researchers posit a learning model in which individuals act first based 
only on their private information and later infer information based on market data.  
Forsythe and Lundholm (1990) notably report that existing models fail to yield a 
formal model explaining the process of achieving RE equilibrium, as they do not 
afford the experimenter sufficient control over key factors such as traders’ 
information sets and sequences of market action.  Arguably the most significant 
contribution of Forsythe and Lundholm (1990) is their discovery that a market 
was capable of information aggregation despite heterogeneous preferences 
amongst individual traders, given that all agents possessed both experience gained 
from market repetition and knowledge of all existing dividend payoff structures. 
9
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Sunder (1992) augmented his study of laboratory asset markets by 
complimenting them with markets for insider information about the asset 
dividends.  Seven markets were studied, participants were undergraduate and 
graduate-level business students; subjects in 4 markets were inexperienced, while 
those comprising the other three had previously participated in a laboratory 
market.  Two or three states of nature determined the dividend payout for the 
single-period security.  One was drawn randomly before trading began and while 
the odds of which type would be chosen were made known to all traders, the true 
state of nature was not.  In two markets, all participants were asked to submit a 
sealed bid in an information market for the true state.  In these markets, the top 
four bidders each paid the amount of the fifth highest bid and were consequently 
provided the actual state of nature and therefore the true value of the security. The 
identity of these buyers was not revealed, although the price paid for the 
information was.  In five markets, the price of this information was fixed and all 
those willing to buy it were allowed to do so.  The number of traders having 
chosen to pay was announced, though their identities were again kept undisclosed.  
In five of the seven markets, traders were randomly and evenly divided into two 
groups with different dividend structures and one of two possible states of nature 
was drawn.  In the other two markets, there were three possible states of nature 
and all traders were given identical dividend structures.   
Sunder (1992) found that when the supply of information was fixed to 
only the highest bidders, both the asset markets and markets for information each 
behaved in a manner consistent with the rational expectations model and 
simultaneously approach a fully revealing state of equilibrium.  The study 
alternately revealed that when price as opposed to quantity is fixed in the 
information markets, the asset market’s behavior is congruent with the noisy 
rational expectations model.   
The research supports Plott and Sunder’s (1982) conclusion that the 
rational expectations model is capable of explaining asset markets with 
asymmetric information, though the key finding of Sunder (1992) was the 
establishment that the REE model was able to accomplish this for both asset 
markets and information markets, and do so simultaneously. 
Approaching the turn of the millennium, the study of experimental 
economics had established that laboratory markets were quite capable of 
information aggregation/dissemination, although the limitations of this 
mechanism were relatively unexplored.  Nöth, Camerer, Plott and Weber (1999) 
followed the task of discovering the limits of a market’s ability to aggregate and 
disseminate information in the presence of asymmetric information. 
In their study of 14 market sessions, Nöth, Camerer, Plott and Weber 
(1999) observe periods of market inefficiency resulting from misaligned beliefs 
among traders.  These “information traps,” as the researchers refer to them, are 
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indicative of individual non-rational behavior in the market.  The researchers note 
that similar market behavior was observed by Sunder (1992), as markets 
converged to an altogether wrong price.  
Among its conclusions, Nöth et al. (1999) found several market conditions 
minimized the occurrence of information traps and fostered convergence to a fully 
revealing rational expectations equilibrium.  Primarily, a full set of Arrow-Debreu 
conditions contribute to a market’s ability to reach efficiency.  Participants with 
prior experience in experimental markets were found to be more able to identify 
potential non-rational behavior by other traders and the formation of information 
traps in the market; traders familiar with the market structure and general 
information are able to more effectively evaluate price movement and harvest 
information from market behavior and endogenous signals. (Nöth et al. 1999) It 
follows from this conclusion that conducting practice trading rounds would 
increase the chances of a market reaching rational expectations equilibrium by 
decreasing the sample group’s susceptibility to information traps. 
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Table 1: Summary of Parameters and Conclusions within Similar Experimental Security Market Research 
Summary of Experimental Market Research 
Author(s) Year Title Type of 
Information  
Trader 
Experience 
Dividend 
Structure Across 
Traders 
Conclusion 
Charles Plott and 
Shyam Sunder 
1982 Efficiency of Experimental 
Asset Markets with Insider 
Information: An 
Application of Rational-
Expectations Models 
Complete and 
Incomplete, 
given to one-
half the traders 
Inexperienced Asymmetrical Markets are able to disseminate 
information, consistent with the rational 
expectations model 
Charles Plott and 
Shyam Sunder 
1988 Rational Expectations and 
the Aggregation of Diverse 
Information in a 
Laboratory Security 
Markets 
Incomplete, 
given to all 
traders 
Inexperienced, 
Experienced 
Asymmetrical Markets are able to aggregate private 
information held by traders and 
disseminate it through price sign 
Robert Forsythe and 
Russell Lundholm 
1990 Information Aggregation in 
an Experimental Market 
Incomplete, 
given to all 
traders 
Inexperienced, 
Experienced 
Asymmetrical Achievement of rational expectations 
equilibrium is dependent on trader  
experience and experiment replication 
Shyam Sunder 1992 Market for Information: 
Experimental Evidence 
Complete, 
given only to 
portion of 
traders who 
bid highest in 
info. market 
Inexperienced, 
Experienced 
Asymmetrical, 
Symmetrical 
A market for a fixed supply of insider 
information, when that information  
was supplied only to the highest bidder, 
achieved RE equilibrium along with  
the asset market in which the 
information was used 
Markus Noth, Colin 
F. Camerer, Charles 
Plott, and Martin 
Weber 
1999 Information Aggregation in 
an Experimental Markets: 
Traps and Misaligned 
Beliefs 
Complete to 
one-third, 
Incomplete to 
remaining 
two-thirds 
Inexperienced, 
Experienced 
Symmetrical A full set of Arrow-Debreu conditions 
foster achievement of RE Equilibrium;  
individual non-rational behavior in a 
security market can lead to convergence  
within the market to an altogether 
incorrect price 
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Political Stock Markets and the Marginal Trader Hypothesis 
The Iowa Political Stock Market (IPSM), which would later become known as the 
Iowa Electronic Market (IEM), was created in 1988 in a nonconventional 
application of experimental economics.  While a market-decision mechanism had 
previously been used for predicting political election outcomes, the IPSM was the 
first to do so strictly in the interest of research.   
The market allowed participants to trade securities for candidates in upcoming 
elections in an experimental market; each security pays dividends according to the 
percentage of votes the candidate received. (Forsythe et al. 1992)  The 1988 IPSM 
for the presidential election was a double-auction market allowing participants to 
trade futures over the Internet using their own money and do so in real-time.   
There were 192 voluntary participants in the market, who between them held 
1,462 shares in each candidate.  Share portfolios and cash reserves among all 
traders were a combined $4,967; the average individual invested just over $25. 
(Forsythe et al. 1992)  At close, the 1988 IPSM was trading shares in George 
Bush at 53.2 and shares of his opponent Michael Dukakis at 45.2; the election on 
November 8th gave Bush 53.2% of the votes and Dukakis 45.4%.  The market 
outperformed essentially every major national poll including Gallup in predicting 
each candidate’s relative percentage of the vote and also the marginalized lead. 
(Forsythe et al. 1992) 
Forsythe and his colleagues explore three possible explanations for the 
market’s success. The first and most basic theory they posit is the possible role of 
pure and random luck in the observed results, though they conclude the sample 
size is large enough to refute this suggestion.  Secondly, they evaluate the 
possibility that the IPSM was accurate in predicting election results because the 
sample group was representative of the population in their presidential 
preferences and therefore naturally produced results similar to those observed in 
the election as they acted on personal biases.   The dismiss this possibility by 
citing research into the 1988 U.S. presidential election which found that more 
traders in their market switched bias towards candidate Michael Dukakis and 
were in fact not sufficiently biased towards the winner George H. W. Bush. 
(Forsythe et. al 1992)  The researchers endorse the third, the MTH: it purports that 
price is actually dictated by a fraction of the overall trader population who, 
recognizing the opportunity to profit from apparent mispricings in the market, buy 
or sell a stock accordingly and in doing so steer the price to the correct level.  In 
layman’s terms, marginal traders are able to profit from other less-knowledgeable 
trader’s mistakes and prices are corrected as a by-product of this process.  For 
example, a marginal trader who identified that a market price of $0.48 for a Bush 
(reflecting that the market anticipated Bush would receive 48% of the votes) was 
too low and instead believed Bush would receive 51% of the vote and the 
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security’s true value was $0.51, would buy at all prices below $0.51 and steer the 
market to an efficient price through the shift in demand.  Traders in the 1988 
IPSM were formally identified as “marginal traders” if, on three days during the 
three weeks prior to the election, they had submitted limit orders which were 
either accepted that day or were within two cents of the price at the end of the 
trading day.  Noting that the exact definition of such a trader is fairly vague, 
Forsythe et al. (1992) varied the requirements on both the necessary number of 
days meeting the criteria and also on the limit order’s proximity to closing price; 
they found that adjusting the parameters produced essentially the same results.  
The research found that those participants identified as marginal traders on 
average invested more than double the amount of the non-marginal traders and 
earned a median rate of return of 9.6 percent (the median ROR for the non-
marginal traders was 0).  Also, marginal traders in the study traded a higher 
volume of shares than their counterparts and were active in the market on a 
greater number of days. (Forsythe et al. 1992) 
In conclusion, Forsythe et al. (1992) contributed to the study of the Hayek 
hypothesis by providing contributing evidence from a broader application.  They 
found that even despite apparent barriers such as uninformed traders and non-
rational market behavior, a market was able to achieve efficiency; they assert that 
this efficiency, and market prices in general, are the result of marginal trader 
behavior.    
Oliven and Rietz (2004) further explore the Iowa Electronic Market (IEM) 
and the application of the MTH; in particular, they research the presence of non-
rational trader behavior and outright mistakes in the market and their implications 
on market efficiency. The data they use in their study is from IEM’s 1992 
presidential election market, which was the most accurate IEM market to date, 
had the greatest volume of any IEM market, and also contained a relatively large 
number of active traders.  There were 1000 participants in the market who were 
each limited to a maximum investment of $500, though the average investment 
per person was around $83 as the total investment was approximately $83,000. 
(Oliven and Rietz 2004)  The study segregated market participants much like 
Forsythe et al. (1992), although they refer to marginal traders as market makers 
and the other market participants as price takers; traders who set a limit order on 
their futures were classified as market makers and the price takers were identified 
as traders who submitted market orders and in doing so accepted the limit orders.  
In practice, the market makers set a limit order either above or below the current 
market price depending on which direction they believe it will move and when a 
price taker accepts that order the stock price adjusts accordingly. 
A central focus of Oliven and Rietz (2004) is the study of the behavioral 
anomalies found in the 1992 IEM data.  They identify two distinct “violations of 
individual rationality:” market-making violations and price-taking violations. A 
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market-making violation occurs when a trader posts a best bid or ask (acting as a 
market-maker) which is either respectively above or below market price and 
creates the opportunity for an arbitrageur to make an immediate and risk-free 
profit.  Conversely, a price-taking violation occurs when a trader either buys 
above or sells below a better and readily-available market price.  Oliven and Rietz 
(2004) found these violations were quite prolific in the 1992 IEM, despite the 
market’s efficiency.  They contribute this success to the role of market-makers 
(marginal traders).  Furthermore, the study concludes that a lower ratio of market-
makers relative price-takers increases the frequency of violations and a market 
containing a larger proportion of market-makers produces fewer violations. 
Oliven and Rietz (2004) yields a number of contributions to the study of 
experimental economics and market efficiency as a whole.  Their research 
demonstrates that a market can function efficiently despite frequent violations in 
rational trader behavior.  They report that market-makers compete with one 
another in an effort to profit from others’ mistakes and simultaneously set 
efficient prices.  Oliven and Rietz (2004) conclude that an efficient prediction 
market does not depend on the trader sample being representative of the 
population, but rather a prediction market can achieve an efficient outcome given 
a proportion of the sample traders are willing to fill market-making capacities and 
are presented with the opportunity to profit from others’ mistakes and violations 
in rational behavior.  
 
Methods 
The field of experimental economics has established that experimental markets 
operated within the laboratory function in the same manner as all market 
instruments, including the financial markets, given that the traders are properly 
incentivized.  This is because all rational and self-interested people exhibit profit 
maximizing behavior whether the market is “real” or constructed as an 
experiment. (Smith 1976)  This connection allows researchers to study trader 
actions and market behavior within a controlled experimental environment and 
apply their conclusions to markets which exist outside the laboratory, such as the 
financial security markets.  Accordingly, three sessions were operated as a means 
of studying price formation within an experimental asset market with insider 
information, particularly with the intention to examine the role of insiders in the 
market and the implications of their actions on market efficiency.  Session 1 and 
Session 2 had six participants, and Session 3 had twelve participants.  Participants 
were undergraduate students studying economics at the School of Business and 
Economics at the College of Charleston.  Subjects had some previous experience 
with experimental laboratory markets; they had previously participated in a basic 
double-oral auction in a principles of economics class. 
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All market sessions were comprised of two different stages.  Stage 1 was a 
prediction contest designed to familiarize participants with the state-selection 
mechanism which was used to determine the dividend payouts of securities traded 
in eight concurrently-ran computerized markets in Stage 2.   
Incentives 
All participant compensation in Stage 1 and market activity in Stage 2 was done 
using the fiat currency, guldens; this was seen as most conducive to avoiding 
logistical problems associated with using dollar amounts and allowed flexibility in 
the choice of parameters.  Fiat currency has historically been employed in such a 
capacity in other experiments (Forsythe et al. 1982) and explicitly to accomplish 
the above conditions in Plott and Sunder 1982.  Students earned extra credit in 
their undergraduate economics class based upon their earnings in guldens relative 
the earnings of the others in their session; points were awarded proportionately by 
ranking, so that the student earning the most guldens received the most extra 
credit points and the student earning the least guldens in a round received the least 
extra credit points.  All participants earned at least one point. 
Stage 1 
In Stage 1, traders were asked to predict which of three possible states would be 
randomly selected by rolling two ten-sided dice, one with sides 0-9 and the other 
with sides 00, 10, 20…90.  It was explained to the participants that the two 
numbers rolled would be added together to derive a two digit number between 00-
99 and that each number had an equal chance of being rolled.  The following chart 
of number ranges and their corresponding states was given to the participants: 
Number Range Corresponding State 
00-34 X 
35-79 Y 
80-99 Z 
  
Participants submitted their predictions into a public chat window, which 
they were logged into by a randomly assigned ID number, so that they could see 
others’ predictions; after all participants had submitted their predictions, the dice 
were rolled in plain view of the participants and the true state was published in the 
chat window by the experimenter. Traders were awarded 10 guldens for each 
correct prediction and awarded none for an incorrect prediction.  This process was 
repeated for twenty rounds.  The intention of this stage is to impose on 
participants an understanding of the relative odds assigned to each state so that the 
dividend structure can be properly interpreted.  
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Stage 2 
In Stage 2, participants traded single-period securities in each round which paid 
the owner a one-time dividend at the end of the trading period.  The amount of 
these dividends was kept homogenous for all traders, though the true amount 
depended upon which of two possible states of nature were randomly drawn.  The 
dice mechanism for state-selection and the number ranges which correspond to 
them were the same in Stage 2 as in Stage 1; the following chart describing the 
states and dividends in guldens was given to the participants: 
Number Range Corresponding State Dividend Paid 
00-34 X 50 Guldens 
35-79 Y 240 Guldens 
80-99 Z 490 Guldens 
 
Differences in individual expectations as to this true state of nature 
provided traders incentive to interact in the market in an attempt to maximize 
their earnings at the end of the period.  Markets were set up as double-oral 
auctions in which participants acted as both buyers and sellers; these conditions 
imitate those of many financial markets, including the New York Stock 
Exchange.   
 In accordance with the field’s accepted means for inducing value (Smith 
1976, Plott 1979, Plott and Sunder 1982), individuals were compensated 
according to the following redemption function of the form  
 
 
Mit= d(θ)ait+ΣsPsit-ΣcPcit+Cit, d(θ)>0, ait≥0, where 
 
Mit = gulden earnings of individual i in period t 
d(θ) = dividend rate in terms of fiat money, expressed as a 
function of the state of nature θ 
ai
t
 = units held by individual i at the end of period t 
ΣsPsit = revenue from sales of securities during period t 
ΣcPcit = expenses from purchase of securities during period t 
Cit = initial endowment of fiat money 
 
In congruence with Induced Value Theory, subjects are motivated to 
maximize Mit through market activity.  The values induced on these securities are 
therefore deemed appropriate to test the market models.  Restrictions on the 
exogenous variables are: d(θ) is strictly greater than zero as all dividends are 
constructed to be positive and ait is nonnegative as individuals are prohibited from 
short-selling, or simply from selling a certificate which they do not currently 
possess so that they can never own a negative amount of certificates. 
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At the beginning of each period, each subject was given an initial amount 
of fiat money (Cit) which was sufficiently large so as to eliminate any budget 
constraints which may otherwise have retarded market activity.  For Stage 2, the 
fiat currency used was again guldens; each trader was given a bank of 10,000 
guldens in each period with which to trade.  Similarly, each individual was given 
an initial amount of four securities at the start of each period (ait) with which to 
trade in the market.  There was a fixed supply of securities, Σiait; the total supply 
of certificates in Sessions 1 and 2 was 24 securities among the six traders, and the 
total supply of certificates in Session 3 was 48 among the twelve traders. 
Before the first trading period began, all participants were thoroughly 
briefed on the laboratory market process and specifically on the state-of-nature 
mechanism which would ultimately determine the securities’ dividend yield at the 
end of each period.   
Prior to the beginning of each round, a portion of randomly selected 
participants were selected as insiders or “marginal traders.”  These marginal 
traders were given a clue as to the true realized state which would determine the 
dividend payout, and therefore the true market price, of a security.  This clue was 
transmitted to the traders in the chat room through a private message sent by the 
experimenter.  These traders can be referred to as imposed marginal traders, as 
information was given to them by the experimenter so that they were more 
knowledgeable of the true price than their counterparts.  To protect the anonymity 
of the marginal traders, blank messages were simultaneously distributed to the 
remaining subjects.   
Each round was operated for five minutes as an independent market, with 
its own independently selected state and a unique set of traders selected to receive 
hints.  There were no limits on re-sale so traders were limited only in that there 
was no short-selling allowed: a trader could only sell certificates which were in 
his or her possession at the time of the transaction.   
Each individual trader was responsible for recording their predictions in 
Stage 1 and transactions in Stage 2.  This was done using a Microsoft Excel 
Workbook for each trader which was programmed with macros such that traders 
only needed to enter their prediction and the selected state in Stage 1 and only 
needed to enter the price of any transactions conducted in Stage 2, and their 
earnings and remaining banks of guldens and certificates were automatically 
calculated and displayed in real time; this allowed traders to track the profitability 
of their decisions and presumably make informed decisions in later rounds so as 
to maximize their earnings. 
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Table 2: Design of Markets 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Design of Markets 
 
Number of Traders Initial Endowment Dividends Probabilities Expected Dividends 
Session Total 
No. Given 
Hints Certificates Guldens X Y Z X Y Z 
No 
Hint 
"Not 
X" 
Not 
Y" 
"Not 
Z" 
1 6 3 4 10,000 50 240 490 0.35 0.45 0.20 223.5 317 210 157 
2 6 2 4 10,000 50 240 490 0.35 0.45 0.20 223.5 317 210 157 
3 12 4 4 10,000 50 240 490 0.35 0.45 0.20 223.5 317 210 157 
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Hypotheses 
Three models are used to form the hypotheses for this study: the Rational 
Expectations (RE) Model, the Prior Information Model, and what may be called 
the Naïve Model.  Table 3 provides the price predictions based upon each of these 
models. 
A security market behaves in a manner congruent with the rational 
expectations (RE) model if, at equilibrium, all traders make decisions as if they 
were aware of the private information of all other traders.  The model holds that 
this can be accomplished without any direct communication between traders and 
despite the fact that traders are not incentivized to divulge their private 
information, either directly or indirectly. (Plott and Sunder 1988)  In the context 
of these sessions, a market round behaving in accordance with the RE model 
would converge to a price equal to the true state’s dividend; this would happen as 
information was aggregated by the market instrument and disseminated through 
price signals to all traders.  The predictions made by the RE model are the same 
as those made by the strong form of the Efficient Markets Hypothesis (EMH), 
where efficient markets are defined such that the market price is reflective of both 
public information and all private or hidden information; since the collective body 
of private information contains hints which eliminate two of the three possible 
states, the strong form of the EMH likewise would predict prices in the market to 
converge to a price equal to the true dividend which will be paid for the security. 
The PI Model explains that traders make decisions based on the 
information which they are given before the start of a round, and accordingly this 
body of information will not be changed by price signals in the market; within 
these markets, the PI model predicts that prices will be dependent upon the 
expected value for each trader based upon the dividend structure which is made 
publicly available and upon the hint which they are given, if any.  Prices behaving 
in a manner congruent with the PI model will converge within the range of 
expected values held by all traders, though the exact price will be dependent on 
individual trader activity.   
The so-called Naïve Model defines that traders will fail to adjust their 
expectations to account for both hints which they are given and to price signals 
sent within the market.  Evidence in support of the Naïve Model would 
accordingly be found in markets where the price rested at the expected value for 
traders receiving no hints; in other words, price expectations are based solely 
upon the dividend structure and state-selection probabilities and the equilibrium 
price will equal the expected value derived from these.  This model can be 
correlated to the weak form of the EMH, where prices are a reflection of all past 
publicly available information; the weak form of the EMH would likewise predict 
prices to converge to the expected value for the security based solely upon the 
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dividend structure and state-selection odds, and would not account for current 
information which is made publicly available, such as price signals in the market. 
Traders’ expected values, defined statistically as the weighted average of 
the possible dividends relative their probability of selection, serves as an 
appropriate measure of their performance as it supports the PI model and semi-
strong form of the EMH as these values reflect only the public and private 
information which has been directly given to a trader.  For example, a trader given 
the hint “Not X” would be certain that the dividend for the round is either 240 or 
490 guldens, which have probabilities of 45% and 20% of being selected from the 
three possible states.  The particular trader’s expected value, because state X has 
been eliminated, is calculated as follows: 
 240 (.45/.65) + 490 (.20/.65) = 316.92 guldens 
This trader, acting only on the information made publicly available and the hint 
directly given him/her, should sell at prices above 316.92 guldens and buy at 
prices below this value. 
  Hypothesis 1: Prices will converge to an equilibrium price explained 
by one of the following models: the RE model, the PI Model, and the Naïve 
Model. 
The Marginal Trader Hypothesis (MTH) explains market efficiency 
through the actions of superior traders who capitalize on mispricings in the market 
so as to maximize their own profits, and correct the price in the process. (Forsythe 
et al. 1992) A market round within this study would be evidence in support of the 
MTH if the traders given information hints as to the true state of nature, referred 
to as imposed marginal traders, capitalized on their superior information and 
exploited mispricings in the market as a means of earning profits and price 
adjusted accordingly to a more accurate level.  For example, a trader given the 
hint “Not X,” can be certain that the true price should not be less than 240 as the 
only two possible states after X has been eliminated pay 240 and 490 guldens; the 
trader would buy any securities for sale at a price of less than 240 and the price in 
the market adjusts accordingly.  Inversely, a trader given the hint “Not Z,” can be 
certain that the true price should not be more than 240 as the only two possible 
states after Z has been eliminated pay 50 and 240 guldens and would accordingly 
sell at all prices greater than 240.  The price signals sent by the marginal traders 
would presumably occur early in a market round, as those without information 
wait for signals to be sent in the form of the early transaction prices and marginal 
traders act on their information.   
 Hypothesis 1b: This convergence will be the result of marginal trader 
activity, defined as signals sent by those traders given insider information 
regarding the true state for the round. 
One alternate way of defining marginal traders according to Forsythe et al. 
(1992) is by their role in a given transaction, as either the trader responsible for 
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posting an offer or the trader who accepts it; they define the former as the “price-
maker” and attribute this characteristic to marginal traders, who are more 
knowledgeable of the true price and have the active role of setting appropriate 
price level rather than accepting the current offer.  Our results showed little 
correlation between participants’ roles in transactions and their statuses as either 
imposed marginal traders or uninformed traders.  A second type of marginal 
trader may accordingly be identified and referred to as an endogenous marginal 
trader, defined as traders within these parameters who exploit mispricings in the 
market and correct price level in the process but do so irrespective of their having 
received insider information.  These intuitive investors are defined within this 
study by their performance in the Stage 1 Prediction Contest: an intelligent 
participant acting on rationality and not emotionality would select State Y in each 
round of Stage 1, as it has the highest probability of being selected regardless the 
past rounds’ states.  Such a participant would conceivably act according to the 
values of their own expected outcome and be more attentive to price signals sent 
in the market.  These endogenous marginal traders can be evaluated as a 
separately defined group as a means of satisfying an alternate definition of 
marginal traders. 
 Hypothesis 2: Traders submitting Stage 1 predictions with greater 
probabilities of being selected, identified as more intuitive than their 
counterparts, will earn greater profits in Stage 2 of the experiment. 
 Plott and Sunder (1988) found that non-marginal trader earnings in later 
rounds of the experiments were equal to the earnings of those who were given 
information.  They explain this through the behavior of the uninformed traders, 
who wait for price signals to be sent by the marginal traders early in the market 
round and are able to discern the true price as a result; this finding was evidence 
in support of the RE Model.  
 Hypothesis 3: Uninformed trader earnings will equal the earnings of 
informed traders in later rounds. 
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Table 3: Model Predictions for Price Equilibrium 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
State Rational Expectations (RE) Model Naïve Model Prior Information (PI) Model      
 
   
 
 
 
 
  Received Hint "Not Y" 210 
X 50 223.5 Received Hint "Not Z" 156.9 
 
  Received No Hint 223.5 
 
    
 
  Received Hint "Not X" 316.9 
Y 240 223.5 Received Hint "Not Z" 156.9 
 
  Received No Hint 223.5 
 
   
 
 
 
 
  Received Hint "Not X" 316.9 
Z 490 223.5 Received Hint "Not Y" 210 
 
  Received No Hint 223.5 
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Results 
A good summary of the results is provided in Figures 2-4.  The results for Session 
1 were relatively insignificant.  The eight rounds comprising Session 1 were 
mostly inundated with noise-trading, marked by transactions sending false 
signals, perhaps because traders had a poor understanding of market signals; 
traders properly utilizing hints with regards to their expected value were unable to 
communicate their information through price signals because others with hints 
and those not given hints were consistently making bids and asks which were 
inconsistent with their expected values based on the potential dividends and 
relative odds.  Table 4 shows the percentages of informed and uninformed traders 
involved in the first three trades of each round.  In Session 1, marginal traders 
represented 54% of the traders involved in the first three trades of each round; the 
trader population was composed of 50% marginal traders.  While the induced 
marginal traders were generally involved in the early transactions in a round 
which would otherwise serve to send signals to the uninformed as to the true state 
and therefore the correct price, these prices were almost exclusively below the 
expected values for all traders, even those receiving the hint “Not Z” and certain 
that the dividend was either 50 or 240 guldens.  With marginal traders comprising 
54% of those involved in the first three trades of each round, this means that 46% 
of the traders involved in the early transactions received no information and had 
no private information which needed to be communicated through the market; the 
high levels of activity on the part of the uninformed likely contributed to the 
failure of these markets at achieving RE equilibrium. 
There was an apparent disconnect between traders understanding of 
appropriate prices and their observation of realized dividends: after the second 
round of Session 1 paid dividends of 490 guldens per certificate with the realized 
state of Z, the first transaction in round three was for 50 guldens.  While the 
underlying cause of the underpricing is unclear, it seems likely to be a 
combination of trader emotionality or risk-aversion and improper calculation of 
expected values.   Several traders consistently made outright violations such as 
posting an asking price of 48 guldens for a security, whilst the least dividends the 
security would yield them should they hold it was 50 guldens.  Only one 
transaction in the first five rounds of Session 1 exceeded 100 guldens, which was 
less than half of the expected value for a trader not receiving a hint.   
The average opening transaction within Session 1 rounds was 73.25 
guldens and the average of the last transactions in the eight rounds was 93.875 
guldens.  Both are considerably below the expected value for the half of 
participants who received no hint in a round and are even below the lowest 
expected values of any trader.  No rational trader acting on the body of publicly 
available information and their own hints should have sold for a price of less than 
their expected value, assuming that the true state could not be inferred from the 
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market.  In none of the transactions conducted in the first six rounds of Session 1 
did the seller act in a manner accordant with his/her own expected values; in other 
words, a rational trader would not have sold at any of the transaction prices in the 
first six rounds because the price was below their expected value for the round’s 
dividend.  It is possible that this decision error would have been corrected by 
some traders should the experiment have continued for a number of additional 
rounds, though the majority of traders would have to adjust their behavior because 
a proportion of traders continuing to sell at unreasonably low prices can only be 
corrected by the intuitive or informed traders by buying at those prices.  Failure to 
adjust for the increase in demand at these prices on the part of some traders would 
indefinitely restrict market prices from achieving efficient levels. 
 
Table 4: Marginal Trader Representation in Early Transactions 
Percentage of Induced Marginal Traders 
Involved in the First Three Transactions  
 Session  
Round 1 2 3 Average 
1 67% 50% 50% 56% 
2 33% 33% 50% 39% 
3 50% 33% 17% 33% 
4 50% 50% 17% 39% 
5 67% 33% 67% 56% 
6 83% 33% 33% 50% 
7 33% 67% 17% 39% 
8 50% 17% 17% 28% 
Average 54% 40% 33% 42% 
 
Sessions 2 and 3 
Conversely, the results for Sessions 2 and 3 gave some insight into the validity of 
the rational expectations model and the Marginal Trader Hypothesis.  Markets in 
both sessions, after the initial rounds were conducted and the participants became 
familiar with the trading mechanism and dividend structure, converged to prices 
near the expected value for traders not receiving any hints at 233 guldens; the 
apparent price to which both markets converged was in fact closer to the median 
dividend of 240 guldens for State Y.  Two-thirds of the traders in these sessions 
did not receive hints in a given round so this is not an unlikely outcome, though it 
is not in direct accordance with our models. 
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Figure 1: Session 1 Transaction Prices 
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Figure 2: Session 2 Transaction Prices 
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Figure 3: Session 3 Transaction Prices 
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 The introduction of insider information did little to shift prices from the 
median dividend value after traders had settled there, despite signals being sent by 
the imposed marginal traders reflecting the information which had been given to 
them at the start of the round.  There were price-correcting trends observed in 
Session 2 when prices were driven down in rounds 1 and 2 when the state was X 
and the dividend was 50, though the market struggled to adjust to the higher 
rational expectations equilibrium price of 490 in rounds 4 and 8 when the state 
was Z.  Price levels in Session 3 were appropriately lower when the state was X in 
rounds 1, 2 and 5 and the rational expectations equilibrium price and realized 
dividend were 50, though the lack of discernible trends in price changes indicate 
this may be the result of undervaluing the expected value with no information 
introduced or the result of price signals sent by the imposed marginal traders not 
being assimilated into the market amidst noise-trading.  Transaction prices never 
exceeded 230 in round 3 of Session 3 of Session 3, the only round in which Z was 
the selected state and the realized dividends were 490 guldens. 
Marginal traders were on the “winning” side, defined where a transaction 
ultimately benefitted the trader once the round’s dividend was realized (a trader in 
a round paying a 240 gulden dividend was defined as winning if he/she bought a 
certificate in the round for less than 240 guldens or sold a certificate for more than 
240 guldens, and vice versa; trades made at the exact price of the round’s 
dividend were not counted), of 58.2% and 53.6% of their aggregate transactions 
in Sessions 2 and 3, respectively; conversely, those traders not given hints were 
defined as winning on 45.5% of their transactions in Session 2 and 48% of their 
transactions in Session 3. 
 The average profits in Stage 2 of imposed marginal traders exceeded those 
of their counterparts in five of the eight rounds in Session 2 and in four of the 
eight rounds in Session 3.  It was often the case that traders receiving one type of 
hint profited based on the disparity between their expected value and the realized 
dividend, while those receiving the opposite type of hint suffered losses for the 
same reason.  This is because traders acting solely on their own private 
information (the hint they received) and the public information (dividend 
structure) while failing to infer the private information of others through market 
signals cannot be certain of the true state and must act only on their expected 
value, which is not the efficient or correct price.   
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Table 5: Correlation of Performance Factors for Session 2 Participants 
Y-Guesses Avg. Probability Total No. No. "Price Making" % "Price Making" Stage 1 Stage 2
Stage 1 Predictions Y-Guesses 1
Avg. Probability 0.974272469 1
Transaction Activity Total No. -0.693068591 -0.670101145 1
No. "Price Making" -0.406711127 -0.391586699 0.912505873 1
% "Price Making" 0.146049919 0.109989925 0.516184258 0.808131606 1
Profits Stage 1 0.87530155 0.924028547 -0.840381095 -0.679507738 -0.263572605 1
Stage 2 -0.621851211 -0.554477289 0.637293332 0.643548808 0.297703581 -0.660595925 1
ProfitsTransaction ActivityStage 1 Predictions
 
  
 
Table 6: Correlation of Performance Factors for Session 3 Participants 
Y-Guesses Avg. Probability Total No. No. "Price Making" % "Price Making" Stage 1 Stage 2
Stage 1 Predictions Y-Guesses 1
Avg. Probability 0.88006356 1
Transaction Activities Total No. 0.190170695 0.250872191 1
No. "Price Making" 0.06453473 0.060404723 0.545557757 1
% "Price Making" -0.059498443 -0.148068603 -0.222360593 0.625166201 1
Profits Stage 1 0.218943511 0.270159575 0.588718904 0.48980509 0.068653505 1
Stage 2 0.148452673 0.285907451 0.233730904 0.358251895 0.173749609 0.054759748 1
Stage 1 Predictions Transaction Activities Profits
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Above, tables 2 and 3 show that there were few discernible correlations 
among measurements of participant performance in both stages of Sessions 2 and 
3.  The average probability of a participant’s prediction in the Stage 1 contest is 
unsurprisingly correlated to both the number of times they predicted the state to 
be Y (which had the highest probability of selection) and their earnings in Stage 
1. 
 Several measurements describing characteristics of activity levels and 
market intelligence used to categorize marginal traders are shown in correlation to 
trader profitability.  The number of Y-guesses, identified above as a marker for 
endogenous marginal traders in congruence with the definition of Forsythe et al. 
(1992), was surprisingly not well correlated to earnings in the Stage 2 market in 
Session 3 and was negatively correlated to the same measure in Session 2.  This 
finding can be explained, however, by the correlation between Stage 1 earnings 
and Stage 2 profits, which was negative in Session 2 and near-zero in Session 3; 
trader success in the prediction contest did not correspond to success in the 
security markets, so the measurement of endogenous marginal traders by their 
success in Stage 1 is either inappropriate or those classified as endogenous 
marginal traders performed poorly in the markets. 
A higher number of transactions per round made by a trader, another 
identifier of marginal traders described by Forsythe et al. (1992), was positively 
correlated to Stage 2 earnings; the correlation coefficient was 0.637 in Session 2 
and 0.234 in Session 3.  A higher number of “price-making” transactions was 
likewise positively correlated to Stage 2 earnings in both Sessions 2 and 3, with 
correlation coefficients of 0.643 in Session 2 and 0.358 in Session 3. 
Marginal traders represented only 40% of those involved in the first three 
transactions in Session 2, and 33% of those in Session 3.  This means that 60% 
and 67% of the traders involved in the early transactions of Sessions 2 and 3, 
respectively, were acting without having received information. 
 
Discussion  
Session 1 notwithstanding, the traders in the experimental security markets of this 
study were able to conform to prices near the expected value in later rounds; 
Sessions 2 and 3 support Hypothesis 2, while Session 1 fails to support it.   
Traders in all Sessions were unable to steer prices away from the median 
dividend with different states despite the introduction of partial information.  
Consequently, the markets failed to approach rational expectations equilibrium in 
all rounds except those in which the state was Y and the corresponding dividend 
was 240, though there is apparently no reason to infer that traders are not still 
trading in the range of the expected value for those not given information of 223.5 
and the median dividend of 240.  This conclusion is supported by the last round of 
Session 2: after trading at accurate levels for three consecutive rounds in which 
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the state was Y and the dividend was 240, transaction prices remained in the same 
range for the eighth round in which the State was Z and the dividend was 490.  
This result is consistent with the Prior Information (PI) model: traders made 
decisions based upon the information which they were given prior to beginning a 
trading round and did not adjust their behavior based on newly revealed 
information in the form of price signals.  Similarly, the results in Sessions 2 and 3 
are in line with the semi-strong form of the EMH: in equilibrium, the market price 
was a reflection of all past and currently-available public information.  The results 
fail to support the strong form of the EMH, as the market price did not reflect 
private information in addition to public.  
The market price did not reflect the distributed information, as the traders 
were unable to transmit and respond to signals in price formation.  While the 
imposed marginal traders in Sessions 2 and 3 were almost exclusively acting in 
accordance with their own expected values, particularly in later rounds, these 
indications that the market price was over or under the true price were not 
identified as such and the following transactions apparently failed to incorporate 
the information produced by the early trades. This occurred despite the fact that 
imposed marginal traders were consistently involved in the early trades of each 
round.   
The failure of these markets to achieve an efficient equilibrium in 
accordance with the RE model and strong form of the EMH is likely the result of 
several contributing factors.  Firstly, participants were undergraduate students 
with minimal experience interacting in such a double-oral auction market; there 
were significant struggles in the early rounds to explain the logistical operation of 
the market to participants, and the experimenters refrained from explaining profit-
maximizing strategy and proper information inference to the participants in order 
to avoid corrupting the results.  This study struggled to replicate the success 
observed by Plott and Sunder (1982, 1988), whose participants were recruited 
from graduate school at the University of Chicago and the California Institute of 
Technology, with less-sophisticated traders.  Secondly, the excessive amount of 
noise-trading by uninformed or irrationally behaving traders flooded the market 
with false information so that even the most observant traders, the endogenous 
marginal traders, were unable to infer accurate price signals.  A third explanation 
for the failure to achieve rational expectations equilibrium is a matter of market 
design.  The convergence in transaction prices to the true dividend value observed 
by Plott and Sunder (1988) was strengthened in later rounds after the traders had 
greater experience interacting in the market and observing price signals; the 
markets in their study generally consisted of 14 rounds lasting seven minutes 
each.  At the time of their last transaction, subjects in their study had participated 
in over an hour and a half of trading and seen 14 different state selections; our 
markets combined for 40 minutes of trading with 8 different state selections.  It is 
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likely that greater accuracy would have been observed were the experiments 
longer in duration, however this would conceivably be the result of imposed 
marginal traders learning to maximize profits using their hints, rather than a shift 
in general market behavior or a discernible change in the markets’ ability to relay 
accurate information and have that information properly interpreted and acted 
upon by all traders.   
These results support the finding of Forsythe and Lundholm (1990) that 
market efficiency is highly dependent on trader experience.  The results seem to 
explain the first half of the model for trader behavior with regards to information 
assimilation formed in Forsythe and Lundholm (1990), which is that traders in an 
experiment begin by acting only on the information they are directly given and 
later learn to act on information they infer from the market.  The shift to inferring 
information from price movements in the market may have been observed in later 
rounds should the experiment have been lengthened, though this is a speculative 
deduction.   
While the imposed marginal traders in Sessions 2 and 3 did largely act in 
accordance with their hints and the corresponding changes in their expected 
values, the signals which would have otherwise been sent by these decisions in 
the market were lost amidst the excessive amount of noise-trading.  It was 
observed that traders receiving no information often participated in the first 
transactions of the round, rather than wait to observe the actions of their co-
traders who were imparted with a hint.  The Marginal Trader Hypothesis, while it 
does account for noise-trading and irrational investors, cannot account for traders 
behaving as if they do have information and sending excessive false signals into 
the market; in this way the non-marginal traders are behaving as if they have 
information and others in the market interpret their actions as if they were 
founded on relevant information.   
Trader familiarity with price moving behavior, presumably honed over a 
longer series of rounds, appears to be a necessity for achieving efficient levels in 
such a market experiment.  A better Stage 1 training mechanism may be designed 
to also train participants how to exploit mispricings in the market and how to infer 
signals as to the true state based upon price movements in the market, as the Stage 
1 training process used in this study and others in the past (Plott and Sunder 1982, 
1988) serves only to teach traders how the states are selected and not how to 
interpret the other intricacies of the Stage 2 security markets. 
Restricting the number of certificates may have hindered an informed 
trader’s ability to push price level down by selling their quantity of certificates if 
he/she believes the market price to be too high; an increase in the number of 
certificates allocated to traders each round would provide more liquidity and not 
affect adjusted profits, which account for earnings on a set of untraded 
certificates.  Evidence supporting this as a potential retarding factor to achieving 
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efficiency can be found in the results of Sessions 2 and 3.  Four of six traders in 
Session 2 sold all of their certificates at one point in time, with a total of six 
occurrences reported; in four of these six times in which traders could no longer 
sell certificates and therefore lower price levels, the constrained party was an 
imposed marginal trader.  Two of twelve traders sold all of their certificates in 
Session 3, each doing so in only one round; in one of the two instances, the 
constrained individual was a marginal trader.  The number of participants in 
Session 2 relative Session 3 likely explains the higher frequency of occurrences in 
the former in which a trader was incapable of sending the signal that the market 
price was too high based upon their information and inferences.  
This study reveals one set of limits to traders conforming to accurate price 
levels with the introduction of partial insider information.  Our participants were 
unable to create and respond to price signals in the market and accordingly price 
levels failed to adjust to the realized states for each round.  It is possible that there 
was an insufficient amount of insider information distributed and the RE model’s 
prediction was not met for this reason, and further research is merited as to the 
required amount of information necessary to achieve RE equilibrium under such 
conditions. 
 
Conclusion 
At a broad level, the results do not support the EMH or MTH, although there is 
some positive evidence of both models.  It is clear that in a market with 
unsophisticated traders, a substantial amount of learning must take place in order 
for the market to achieve efficient price levels, and that outcome may well never 
be reached.  These results are inconclusive as a means of evaluating the MTH as 
an explanation for market efficiency, and there is a need for further research on 
the topic.  The study of experimental economics has established that markets can 
function at rational expectations equilibrium, though the Marginal Trader 
Hypothesis may be a more valid explanation if that price is achieved not as every 
trader acts as if in possession of the collective market intelligence, but rather is 
achieved as a smaller proportion of intelligent and active traders serve their own 
interests by exploiting mispricings in the market and steer prices to RE 
equilibrium levels in the process. 
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Appendix A: Instruction Distributed to Participants for Stage 1 of the 
Experiment 
 
Welcome to the Experiment! 
 
We are conducting an experiment that helps us understand how people make economic 
decisions.  Experimental economics is an important and interesting way for us to learn about how 
people make economic decisions, but in order for these experiments to be successful we must 
follow some simple yet very important rules.   
• We will be using computers for the experiments. Please do not touch anything until you 
are told to do so 
• Please do not speak out loud 
• Do not communicate with anyone in the room but the coordinator 
• If you have a question, raise your hand and a coordinator will visit your station.   
 
Experimental Overview: 
 
This is an experiment in the economics of decision making.  There will be two separate 
experiment stages.  The first will be a prediction game in which you will become familiar with a 
random selection method for determining one of three possible states.  In the second stage, we 
will ask you to participate in a market for trading certificates.  Instructions for both will be fully 
explained to you when the time comes.   
 
This experiment will last approximately one and a half hours; if you are unable or unwilling to 
participate for the duration of the experiment, please raise your hand to notify the coordinator at 
this time.   
 
For your participation today, you will earn extra credit in Professor Blackwell’s class.  In the 
experiment, you will have the opportunity to earn a fiat (mock) currency, guldens.  The more 
guldens you earn in these experiments, the more extra credit you will receive in his class.  You 
should therefore try to earn as many guldens as possible and behave in the same manner you 
would as if these were dollars in your pocket.  Follow the rules, relax, and above all have fun! 
 
Operation of Chat Window: 
 
Your portal into the experiment will be a chat room which is opened in a browser window on the 
screen in front of you.  This will be defined as your station; you are not to leave your station 
during a round.  Please raise your hand to notify the coordinator if you need to be excused 
between rounds, but these breaks will prolong the experiment for everyone involved and are 
discouraged.   
 
In the chat window, you will enter one of the appropriate entry options in the submission box at 
the bottom of the window and hit “Enter.”  These entry options will be explained for each stage, 
and you must limit your submissions to these options.  Do not exit the chat room for any reason 
or engage in any activities other than submitting these entries to the general chat and recording 
the appropriate notes on your record sheets.   
35
McManus and Blackwell: Market Efficiency and the Marginal Trader Hypothesis
Published by Digital Commons @ IWU, 2011
  
Operation of Excel Workbook 
 
In addition to using the chat window to participate in the market, you will use Recording Sheets 
in the form of Microsoft Excel worksheets to keep track of your actions.  Specific instructions 
will be given for using the Sheets in each stage.  Note that you can only enter information into 
cells which are highlighted yellow.  All other information will be automatically calculated for 
you, provided you properly enter information according to the instructions below.  
 
Each of you has a student ID.  This can be found in brackets at the top of the chat window.  For 
example, if your window reads “WebCT Chat—SpecCrs_MarginalStudent/Market Chat 
[studenta13],” your ID would be “A13.”   
 
Instructions for Stage 1: 
 
Each session, we will roll two ten-sided dice.  One die has faces numbered 0-9, and the other has 
ten sides reading 00, 10, 20, 30, 40, 50, 60, 70, 80, and 90.  The two rolls will be added together 
to derive a two digit number. Thus there are 100 possible numerical outcomes, each with an 
equal probability of being selected.  The range of these numbers is 00-99.  The number rolled 
determines a state, which can be either X, Y, or Z.  If the rolled number is between 00 and 34, 
the state will be X.  If the rolled number is between 35 and 79, the state will be Y.  And if the 
rolled number is between 80 and 99, the state will be Z.  A table describing this is given below: 
 
Number Range Corresponding State 
00-34 X 
35-79 Y 
80-99 Z 
 
You have to predict the state of each roll before it is announced.  Before each roll is made, 
submit your prediction (either X, Y or Z) in the chat room window; you may only submit one 
prediction per round.  If you believe the state will be state X, for example, enter “X” in the chat 
window and hit “Enter” on the keyboard.  An example of a proper submission is given below: 
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In the screenshot above, student A1 predicted the state to be X and student A2 predicted the state 
to be Z.  The coordinator then reported the true state in the window.  Both students must now 
record their prediction and the actual state in their “Stage 1 Record Sheet.”   
 
Each student’s proper entry is shown below: 
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Notice that because student A2 correctly predicted the state, his/her earnings for Round 1 
changed to 10 Guldens.   
 
Record your prediction on the proper row of your Record Sheet by entering the corresponding 
letter in the “Prediction” column.  After each student has submitted their prediction, the state will 
be announced.  Record the true state on your Stage 1 Record Sheet in the “State” column.  You 
will be awarded 10 Guldens for each correct prediction and will not be penalized for an incorrect 
prediction.  We will do a number of rounds.  At the end of the stage, your earnings will be given 
to you at the bottom of the Record Sheet beside “Total earnings from Stage 1.” 
 
Are there any questions?  Let’s begin… 
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Appendix B: Instructions Distributed to Participants for Stage 2 of the 
Experiment 
 
Instructions for Stage 2: 
 
In this experiment, we are going to simulate a market in which you will be able to buy and sell 
certificates in a sequence of market rounds.  In your Excel Workbook, click on the tab “Stage 2”; 
this is your Stage 2 Record Sheet.  This sheet is to record your transactions for the second stage 
and to help you determine the value of any decisions you may make.   
 
The type of currency used in this experiment will be guldens.  Like in Stage 1, your objective is 
to earn as many guldens as possible in order to maximize the amount of extra credit you receive 
in Dr. Blackwell’s class.  All market prices and transactions will be in terms of guldens.  At the 
end of the experiment, you and the other students will be ranked in terms of earnings and each of 
you will be given an amount of extra credit proportionate to your earnings.  Those with higher 
earnings will be compensated with more extra credit points and those with lower earnings will 
receive less extra credit points.  The more guldens you earn, the more extra credit points you 
receive. 
 
Your profits come from two sources: (i) from collecting certificates and receiving dividends on 
those held at the end of the round and (ii) from buying and selling certificates.  During each 
market round, you are free to buy and sell as many certificates as you wish, provided you adhere 
to the rules below.  For each certificate you hold at the end of the round, you will be given one of 
the three dividend amounts listed on your Dividend Sheet.  Note that these amounts are 
dependent on the randomly selected state; this process is explained further later in the 
instructions. 
 
Your total earnings for a round will be computed by multiplying the number of certificates held 
by the amount paid per certificate given the realized state (either X, Y or Z).  For example, if you 
held three certificates and the realized state was X, which pays 50 guldens in dividends for each 
certificate, your Total Earnings on Certificates for the round would be 150 guldens (3 certificates 
x 50 guldens).   
 
Sales from your certificate holdings increase your bank of guldens by the selling price.  
Conversely, purchasing certificates decreases your guldens on hand by the purchase amount.  In 
this manner you can gain or lose guldens by purchasing and reselling certificates.  At the end of 
each round, all certificates are automatically sold to the experimenter at a price of 0, so that the 
only value of a certificate at the end of a trading round is equal to the dividend paid. 
 
At the beginning of each round, you are provided with 4 certificates and 10,000 guldens.  Note 
that you may keep the certificates for the entire round and you can earn at least the dividends 
paid when a particular state is rolled.  Similarly, you can retain your entire bank of guldens or 
you may use it to buy certificates.  You are free to buy and sell certificates as you wish, subject 
to the rules below.  Your guldens on hand at the end of a market round are determined by your 
initial endowment of guldens, earnings paid on certificates you hold at the end of a round, and 
any profits from buying and selling certificates during the market round. 
39
McManus and Blackwell: Market Efficiency and the Marginal Trader Hypothesis
Published by Digital Commons @ IWU, 2011
 Information about Dividends: 
 
Whether a certificate pays the X-dividend, Y-dividend, or Z-dividend is determined by the 
experimenter at the beginning of each round by rolling two ten-sided dice.  One die has ten sides 
with the digits 0-9 and the other has ten sides reading 00, 10, 20, 30, 40, 50, 60, 70, 80, and 90.  
The two numbers will be added together to derive a two-digit number; in this way there are 100 
possible numerical outcomes (numbers 00-99), each with an equal probability of being rolled.  If 
the number rolled is between 00 and 34, then the state for the round will be X and certificates 
will pay the X-dividend.  If the number is between 35 and 79, the state for the round will be Y 
and certificates will pay the Y-dividend.  If the number is between 80 and 99, then the state for 
the round will be Z and certificates will pay the Z dividend.  This information is provided in the 
table below.   
 
Number Range Corresponding State Dividend Paid 
00-34 X 50 Guldens 
35-79 Y 240 Guldens 
80-99 Z 490 Guldens 
 
At the beginning of each market round, each student will receive a private message in the chat 
room which will contain one of the following pieces of information: (i) Not X, (ii) Not Y, (iii) 
Not Z, (iv) Blank.  If your clue contains “Not X,” the true state which has been randomly chosen 
for the round will not be X, leaving states Y and Z as the only possibilities.  If your clue card 
contains “Not Y” then you can be certain the state is not state Y, and the same is true for the clue 
“Not Z.”   A “Blank” message tells you no information about the state.  In any given round there 
may be a number of clues as to the true state and a number of blank clue messages; this includes 
rounds in which only blank messages are distributed.  You can only be certain that everyone 
receives a message, and that between all and none of the students have been given a useful clue 
message.  Note that any information sent to you is private and it is in your best interest not to 
share that information with anyone else, as they may have received different information or none 
at all. 
 
Trading and Recording Rules: 
 
1. All transactions are for one certificate at a time.  After making a trade, you must record 
the transaction price on your Stage 2 Record Sheet under the appropriate column (be it 
“Sell” or “Purchase,” depending on your role in the trade).  The first transaction is 
recorded on Row 1 and subsequent trades are to be recorded on the rows below. 
2. You record the price in the appropriate cell, your new holdings of certificates and guldens 
on hand will be automatically calculated for you and displayed in the same row in which 
you enter the price.  Note that your number of certificates and of guldens on hand may 
never go below zero. 
3. At the end of the market round, the state will be announced.  Record the appropriate letter 
in your Stage 2 Record Sheet beside “Selected State.” 
4. Your Total Earnings for Round 1 will be displayed below the Market Round 1 table.  
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5. Scroll down to the table for Market Round 2 and the experiment will be repeated.  
Remember that you will receive a new piece of information about the dividends in a 
private message in the chat window each round.  Each round is independent, and 
information given in one round may not be applicable for other rounds.  For example, if 
you receive the hint “Not X” in Round 1, you can be certain the state in Round 1 is not 
going to be X; the state in Round 2 or any other round may still be X (or Y or Z). The 
market will be operated for a number of rounds. 
 
Market Organization: 
 
The market for these security certificates is organized as follows.  The market will be conducted 
for a series of sessions or rounds, each lasting five minutes.  Anyone wishing to buy a certificate 
may post a bid in the Chat Room to purchase one certificate at a specific price, and everyone is 
free to accept the bid there by posting in the room.  A student may make a bid to purchase one 
certificate by posting “Bid amount” and another student may accept by posting “Sell at amount.”  
The first student to post their acceptance enters into a contracted sale.  The coordinator will 
indicate when a trade has occurred and send a corresponding message: “A1 to A3; amount.”  
 
Both parties must then record the transaction price on their Stage 2 Record Sheet under the 
appropriate column (either “Sale” or “Purchase,” depending on your role in the trade).  Your 
updated amounts of certificates and guldens on hand will be calculated and displayed in the same 
row for that trade.  Similarly, anyone wishing to sell one certificate by posting an asking price 
may do so in the Chat Room by posting “Ask amount.”  A student may agree to buy the 
certificate at that price by posting “Buy at amount.”   
 
You must adhere to a bid-ask improvement rule: any newly submitted bid to purchase a 
certificate must be a higher offer than existing open bids, and conversely any newly submitted 
asking price for selling a certificate must be lower than any existing offer.  In other words, you 
may not bid to buy a certificate for 150 guldens if there is an open offer in the market to buy a 
certificate for 160 guldens.  Likewise, you may not ask a price of 180 guldens to sell a certificate 
when there is an open offer in the market to sell at 170 guldens. 
 
With the exception of bids and their acceptance, you are not to talk or nonverbally communicate 
with any other students.  You are free to make as much profit as you can, keeping in mind that 
your profit in guldens relative the other students will determine the amount of extra credit you 
earn for class. 
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In the above example, trader A2 begins the round by offering to buy one certificate for 150 
guldens by posting “Bid 150” in the chat window.  Trader A1 counters the offer by asking for 
180 guldens to sell one certificate.  After trader A2 increases his bid to 160 guldens, trader A3 
enters the market and she asks for 170 guldens to sell a certificate.  Trader A2 increases his bid 
to 165 guldens and trader A3 agrees to sell a certificate at this price by posting “Sell at 165.”  
The moderator, Calvin Blackwell, officially verifies the sale, posting the seller (A3), the buyer 
(A2) and the price (165).  Notice that all traders adhered to the bid-ask improvement rule by only 
posting improvements to the outstanding offers.  Traders A2 and A3 must now make the 
appropriate entries into their Stage 2 Record Sheet.  Trader A3’s Record Sheet is shown below: 
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As the seller of the certificate, trader A3 enters the selling price of 165 guldens under “Sale” on 
the row for Transaction No. 1.  After entering the transaction price in the appropriate cell, the 
amount of certificates and guldens on hand automatically change.  Trader A3 has sold one of her 
certificates, so her number of certificates on hand decreases from 4 to 3; likewise, the amount of 
guldens on hand has increased in the amount of guldens the trader earned from the sale.  The 
appropriate recordings for trader A2 are depicted below: 
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As the buyer, trader A2 has appropriately entered the transaction price of 165 guldens under 
“Purchase.”  Accordingly, his number of certificates on hand has automatically increased to 5 
and his amount of guldens on hand has decreased by the 165 guldens the trader paid for the 
certificate.   
 
For simplicity’s sake, we will assume that these were the only two trades in the round.  The 
randomly selected number was 81, which corresponds to a state of Z.  Each trader must then 
enter “Z” in the highlighted cell beside “Selected State” at the bottom of this round.  Dividend 
earnings and Total Earnings for Round 1 will be automatically calculated and displayed at the 
bottom of the round’s table.  Trader A3’s Stage 2 Record Sheet with the appropriate entries is 
shown below, as it should appear at the end of the round: 
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Trader A2’s completed sheet is shown below: 
 
 
 
Are there any questions?  Let’s begin… 
 
45
McManus and Blackwell: Market Efficiency and the Marginal Trader Hypothesis
Published by Digital Commons @ IWU, 2011
Appendix C: Recruitment Announcement 
 
Students, 
 
You have the opportunity to participate in an upcoming economics experiment; participants in 
the experiment will be trading dividend-bearing assets in a computerized market as a means of 
studying market behavior and trader decision making.  For your participation, you will earn at 
least one point extra credit added to your next test, and as many as five points, depending on 
your performance in the markets.  There are no negative consequences should you choose not to 
participate.  There are three sessions which will be operated: 
 
Tuesday March 16, 3:30-5:00 pm 
Thursday March 18, 3:30-5:00 pm 
Friday March 19, 3:00-4:30 pm 
 
If you are willing to participate, please email Dr. Blackwell at blackwellc@cofc.edu to confirm 
your available times, and he will send you a confirmation email.  Your participation is entirely 
optional, but if you confirm one of the below times you will be expected to arrive on time and 
remain for the duration of the experiment; this experiment will last approximately one and a half 
hours. 
 
Thank you for your interest. 
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Appendix D: Consent Form 
 
INFORMED CONSENT AGREEMENT TO PARTICIPATE IN RESEARCH 
 
The following information describes the research study in which you are being asked to participate.  Please read the 
information carefully.  Afterwards, you will be asked to sign if you agree to participate.  
 
A. INVESTIGATORS:  Calvin Blackwell and Clay McManus, Department of Economics & Finance, College of 
Charleston.   
B. PURPOSE:  This study involves research.  Its purpose is to examine markets and market performance.   
C. EXPECTED DURATION:  The length of time you are expected to participate in the study is one and a half hours. 
D. PROCEDURES:  We will be conducting two stages of the experiment; each will be preceded by 10-15 minute 
explanation of the rules and procedures. You will be rewarded with extra credit in Dr. Blackwell’s class based upon 
your decisions.  
E. POSSIBLE DISCOMFORTS AND/OR RISKS: We know of no significant risks or discomforts associated with 
this study. 
F. POSSIBLE BENEFITS:  Benefits that you may experience through participation in this study include a better 
understanding of your own decision-making processes, as well as compensation in the form of extra credit in Dr. 
Blackwell’s class for your time.  There are no negative consequences should you choose not to participate; your grade 
cannot be harmed, either by participating or not participating.  Regardless your choice to participate and any choices 
you make in the experiment, your grade will only be affected by an increase in the amount of extra credit earned, there 
will be no other consequences affecting your grade or treatment in the class. 
G. CONFIDENTIALITY:  The results of your decisions will be kept entirely confidential. Only the aggregate results 
(for example, the average decision made by all participants today) of this experiment will be published; no individual 
identifying information will be released. As much as is possible, identifying information will be kept separate from data 
collected during the experiment. The researchers will keep two databases – one with your name and extra credit earned; 
and a second database with the records of your actions during the experiment. During and after the experiment you will 
be identified only by your participant number. At no time will your name be linked to the record of your actions today.  
Dr. Blackwell will not be shown the results of your decisions today until the end of the semester when he will allocate 
the appropriate amount of extra credit; this will protect you against any possible discrimination in his class. 
H. COMPENSATION:  You will be given extra credit for both your participation and your decisions. These decisions 
involve uncertainty, and so we cannot guarantee a particular amount; however, we can guarantee you will earn a 
minimum of one point on your next test in Dr. Blackwell’s class, and you could earn up to five points.  The better 
decisions you make, the more extra credit you will earn.  It is highly unlikely that more than half of you will earn all 
five points. 
I. VOLUNTARINESS:  Your participation is completely voluntary.  Refusal to participate in this study will not result 
in any penalty or loss of benefits to which you are otherwise entitled.  You may likewise discontinue participation in 
the study at any time without penalty or loss of benefits.   
J. CONTACT INFORMATION:  Calvin Blackwell (843-953-7836) will gladly answer any questions you may have 
concerning the purpose, procedures, and outcome of this project.  You may also contact the College of Charleston 
Institutional Review Board (IRB) through the Office of Research & Grants Administration (843-953-5673) to convey 
any questions or concerns you may have about the rights of study participants.  (The IRB is a college committee 
concerned with the protection of human subjects in research.)   
 
I have read and understand the information in this consent form and agree to participate in this study.  Although the 
investigator will make every effort to maintain confidentiality, I understand that research records must be made 
available to the College's Institutional Review Board, if for any reason they should be requested.  I will receive a copy 
of this form after it has been read and signed. 
 
_______________________________________________________                                ______________ 
Printed Name of Participant/Parent/Legal Guardian                                                                      Date 
 
_______________________________________________________ 
Signature of Participant/Parent/Legal Guardian      
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